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Abstract: Developing and delivering appropriate, affordable, well-adapted medicines for HIV/AIDS remains an urgent 
challenge: as first-line therapies fail, increasing numbers of people require costly second-line therapy; one-third of ARVs 
are not available in pediatric formulations; and certain key first- and second-line triple fixed-dose combinations do not 
exist or sufficient suppliers are lacking. UNITAID aims to help solve these problems through an innovative initiative for 
the collective management of intellectual property (IP) rights – a patent pool for HIV medicines. The idea behind a patent 
pool is that patent holders - companies, governments, researchers or universities  - voluntarily offer, under certain 
conditions, the IP related to their inventions to the patent pool. Any company that wants to use the IP to produce or 
develop medicines can seek a license from the pool against the payment of royalties, and may then produce the medicines 
for use in developing countries (conditional upon meeting agreed quality standards). The patent pool will be a voluntary 
mechanism, meaning its success will largely depend on the willingness of pharmaceutical companies to participate and 
commit their IP to the pool. Generic producers must also be willing to cooperate. The pool has the potential to provide 
benefits to all. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Two pills a day: one in the morning, one at night. This 
straightforward treatment regimen for HIV/AIDS is currently 
the mainstay of treatment programmes in many developing 
countries. Fixed-dose combinations (FDC) that combine two 
or more medicines into one pill have simplified AIDS 
treatment protocols, facilitated patient adherence and 
reduced the risk of drug resistance. Vigorous generic 
competition has reduced medicines prices to around US$ 87 
for the first-line FDC of stavudine, lamivudine and 
nevirapine – roughly 1% of the price a decade ago. These 
factors combined have helped make possible a ten-fold 
increase in access to antiretroviral (ARV) therapy in the 
developing world within the span of just six years. 
  Today, however, the treatment landscape is more 
complex. 
  While some older ARVs have become increasingly 
affordable, newer, less toxic products are still too expensive. 
For example, treating a patient for one year with the most 
affordable improved first-line regimen for HIV, as 
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) [1], 
today costs between US$ 613 and 1 033 using originator 
products – at least eight times as much as the older regimen. 
With increasing numbers of AIDS patients failing on their 
first-line therapy, there is also an urgent need to find 
affordable second-line treatments. In addition, about one-
third of ARVs are not available in pediatric formulations, 
making effective treatment of children an even more difficult  
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task. Finally, certain triple FDCs do not exist or sufficient 
suppliers are lacking for the improved first-line regimen and 
for second-line treatment. 
  UNITAID aims to help solve these problems through an 
innovative initiative for the collective management of 
intellectual property rights – a patent pool for HIV 
medicines. 
WHAT IS UNITAID? 
  UNITAID obtains its funds primarily from a solidarity 
tax on airline tickets established by the participating member 
countries. The funds are used to provide regular, sustainable, 
predictable, additional, long-term financing for drugs and 
diagnostics for AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria for use 
in developing countries. The governments of Brazil, Chile, 
France, Norway and the United Kingdom launched 
UNITAID at the UN General Assembly in September 2006. 
To date, 29 countries have committed to contribute, the 
majority of which are low- and middle-income.
1 Countries 
levy a tax on flights leaving from their territories, and can 
adapt the tax according to their individual circumstances. For 
example, in France the tax is 1 EUR on short-haul economy-
class tickets, and up to 40 EUR on long-haul business-class 
flights. A full flight from Paris to New York raises enough to 
cover a year’s treatment for 60 HIV-positive children. Other 
countries are committing multi-year budgetary contributions, 
as has the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. UNITAID is 
an innovative financing mechanism that draws on both 
                                                 
1 Low or middle-income contributors are: Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, 
Guinea, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Niger, Senegal, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, and Togo. High-
income contributors are: Cyprus, France, Luxemburg, Norway, the Republic 
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industrialized and developing countries to provide 
sustainable, long-term funding for health [2]. 
  UNITAID partners with other global health actors to 
decrease drug prices, support quality, and accelerate and 
expand delivery. For example, UNITAID’s implementing 
partner, the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative, has negotiated 
with drug producers to reduce prices for pediatric ARVs 
from $200 to $60 per patient/year and stimulated the 
development of improved formulations. UNITAID has also 
supported the supply of second-line ARVs for 140,000 
patients in 26 countries in 2008, and negotiated to reduce the 
prices of second-line drugs by 23-49% [3]. In addition, 
UNITAID has funded WHO to add 61 medicines to its list of 
prequalified products. And it has supported treatment for 
pediatric and multi-drug resistant TB and helped to prevent 
TB drug stockouts by establishing a strategic international 
stockpile. Finally, UNITAID worked with WHO and 
UNICEF to speed shipments of artemisinin-based 
combination therapy (ACT) for malaria to Liberia and 
Burundi in 2007 in order to avert a stockout. Recently, 
UNITAID has agreed to be a major funder for the first phase 
of the rolling out of the Affordable Medicines Facility for 
Malaria (AMFm), which will be hosted by the Global Fund. 
  The UNITAID Constitution directs the initiative to 
dedicate at least 85% of its spending on products for low-
income countries. 
  To meet its goal of scaling up access to treatment for 
AIDS, TB and malaria, UNITAID has committed to a pro-
health approach to IP: “Where intellectual property barriers 
hamper competition and price reductions, it will support the 
use by countries of compulsory licensing or other 
flexibilities under the framework of the Doha Declaration on 
the Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement and Public Health, when applicable 
[4].” 
  In line with UNITAID’s mission and principles, the 
patent pool initiative aims to provide patients in low and 
middle income countries with increased access to more 
appropriate and affordable medicines. The UNITAID 
Executive Board in July 2008 approved the plan in principle 
to create a patent pool. The patent pool will complement 
other tools that UNITAID uses to achieve these objectives, 
such as reliable financing and bulk purchasing power. 
HOW WILL THE POOL WORK? 
  The principle of a patent pool is to facilitate the 
availability of new technologies by making patents and other 
forms of intellectual property more readily available to 
entities other than the patent holder. The pool is intended to 
avert a “tragedy of the anti-commons [5]” in which people 
are unable to make use of knowledge because of the tangle 
of property rights that can block them.  Patent pools have 
been established in other fields, including for Golden Rice in 
agriculture, for a vaccine for Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), for aircraft to facilitate US military 
efforts in the First World War, and multiple areas of 
information technology; they are formed to overcome 
barriers to access and innovation that may arise when 
relevant patents are owned by many different entities [6, 7]. 
The UNITAID pioneer initiative will lead to the first 
medicines patent pool. 
  The idea behind a patent pool is that patent holders - 
companies, governments, researchers or universities  - 
voluntarily offer, under certain conditions, the intellectual 
property related to their inventions to the patent pool. Any 
company that wants to use the intellectual property to 
produce or develop medicines can seek a license from the 
pool against the payment of royalties, and may then produce 
the medicines for use in developing countries as defined by 
the World Bank. Producers that make use of the patents in 
the pool would need to meet agreed quality standards. 
  In the absence of a patent pool, a company might need to 
obtain licenses from at least three different patent holders to 
be able to develop, produce, export and sell an ARV FDC. A 
very concrete example is the need for an FDC of the newly 
WHO-recommended first-line antiretroviral treatment for 
HIV/AIDS, which would consist of tenofovir (Gilead), 
lamivudine (GlaxoSmithKline) and either nevirapine 
(Boehringer-Ingelheim) or efavirenz (Bristol Myers Squibb). 
An FDC of three of these drugs currently does not exist or is 
in limited supply. The patents on every compound in this 
triple-therapy are held by a different company. A generic 
company seeking voluntary licenses for the development and 
production of these FDCs would have to obtain licences 
from four different patent-holders. However, if these patents 
could be combined in a patent pool the generic company 
would only have to deal with the pool, which would 
considerably decrease transaction costs and risk. Any 
qualified company that wanted to use the inventions could 
get a licence from the pool. The patent pool would be a one-
stop-shop for all parties involved – it would facilitate the 
legal and bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining 
licenses, reduce transaction costs and increase access to the 
intellectual property needed to make important medicines. 
  The pool will help to speed up the availability of lower-
priced, newer medicines because there will be no need to 
wait out the patent term (usually about 20 years) – time 
patients can ill-afford to lose. In exchange for the payment of 
royalties to the patent owners through the pool, any producer 
would be allowed to manufacture the patented medicines and 
sell them in countries well before the expiration of the patent 
term. With licenses covering  both low and middle-income 
countries, the geographical scope of the market would be 
attractively large, thereby encouraging multiple generic 
producers to come forward and access the patents. The 
greater the competition between producers, the more one can 
expect the price of medicines to fall. 
  The patent pool will be a voluntary mechanism, meaning 
its success will largely depend on the willingness of 
pharmaceutical companies to participate and commit their 
intellectual property to the pool. Generic producers must also 
be willing to cooperate. The pool has the potential to provide 
benefits to all: pharmaceutical companies are rewarded for 
their investments into research and development (R&D); 
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more easily and quickly; and patients in developing countries 
get faster access to better, more affordable treatments. 
IS THE POOL FEASIBLE? 
  The idea of patent pools to facilitate medical research is 
gaining ground [8]. In addition to the examples listed above, 
patent pools have been proposed in the field of genetics, 
particularly for gene-based diagnostic testing [6]. The United 
States Patents and Trademark Office has explored the 
potential utility of patent pools for facilitating innovation in 
biotechnology, particularly for genome-related research. At a 
panel on the UNITAID patent pool at the 2008 Mexico City 
AIDS Conference, representatives of drug companies also 
expressed their openness to the idea [9]. Pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) has announced that it would 
make available its neglected disease-related patents through 
a pool and has called on other companies to follow suit [10]; 
others would be able to access those patents to develop 
medicines for the world’s Least Developed Countries. 
Notably, GSK so far has not included HIV-related patents in 
the pool, which has prompted UNITAID to call on GSK to 
join the UNITAID initiative [11]. The Indian Pharmaceutical 
Alliance (IPA) endorsed the UNITAID patent pool initiative 
in its meeting on 5 September 2008. Finally, patent pools 
were among the innovative approaches to research & 
development included in 2008 by the World Health 
Assembly in its Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property [12]. 
  The adoption of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action 
by the WHA signals a normative shift in international 
expectations regarding how the inter-related issues of trade, 
health and intellectual property ought to be managed. 
Specifically, there is widespread recognition that a purely 
market-based system for health R&D suffers from major 
shortcomings: first, patent monopolies lead to high prices of 
essential medicines, thereby restricting access; second, 
priorities are set by the size of the market, not by health 
needs, which leads to over-investment in some disease areas 
and neglect of others; and finally, the proliferation of patent 
monopolies can retard rather than accelerate innovation. A 
patent pool is one way of managing IP from a public health 
perspective and to counteract high prices, spur needs-driven 
research, and facilitate innovation. 
  The potential and hopes for the UNITAID patent pool are 
high, but key details will determine whether the pool is a 
success. In order to achieve both vigorous generic 
competition and economies of scale in production, the size of 
the potential market must be sufficiently large. While the 
default geographical scope of the pool will include all non-
high-income countries, companies may specify that certain 
markets are excluded from the patents that they put into the 
pool. Companies are urged to allow for sufficient scope in 
the licenses so that medicines production can be efficient and 
competitive. Furthermore, it will be critical to obtain licenses 
for patents relevant to priority medicines so that optimal 
FDCs can be developed; for example, if two out of three 
patent-owners agree to allow generic production of a triple 
FDC, but the third one does not, the entire combination 
could be undermined. 
  These concerns highlight the importance of voluntary 
contributions to the patent pool. Why would pharmaceutical 
companies participate? First, as noted above, companies will 
receive royalties for the use of their IP. Second, companies 
can expect a reputational boost from taking pro-active 
measures to improve the global access to medicines 
situation. Third, they can reduce both the monetary and 
political transaction costs associated with negotiating 
licenses and price reductions on a case-by-case basis. Fourth, 
they may get access to new markets and increased 
information about those markets. Finally, they can avert the 
political costs of IP-related conflicts, particularly, the risk of 
compulsory licensing of their patents. 
  If a workable arrangement for access to intellectual 
property through mechanisms such as the patent pool cannot 
be achieved, both patients and companies stand to lose. Not 
only will the development of needed FDCs become far more 
difficult, but the prices of second-line and other new drugs 
are also likely to remain out of reach. Without access to 
affordable medicines, governments may choose to take 
advantage of available flexibilities in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to override patents to 
meet public health needs [13]. Certainly, doing so would 
provide countries with the benefit of lower-cost generic 
alternatives to monopoly-priced drugs. However, since 
compulsory licenses must be granted country-by-country, at 
a global level this approach is less likely to achieve 
economies of scale rapidly, would entail higher transaction 
costs, imply greater uncertainty for generic producers, and 
require significant political capital. Current WTO rules also 
make the export of drugs produced under compulsory license 
a complex, lengthy and cumbersome process [14]. 
  The time is ripe to find new, reliable, sustainable and 
predictable ways – such as through patent pools – of 
ensuring widespread access to new essential medicines [12]. 
WHAT NEXT? 
  UNITAID is currently meeting with pharmaceutical 
companies, research institutions, generic manufacturers and 
other concerned parties to ensure that the patent pool design 
addresses their requirements and achieves the desired public 
health outcomes.  The patent pool operational plan will be 
presented to the UNITAID Executive Board in December 
2009.  The initial focus of the pool will be on AIDS drugs. It 
will concentrate on urgently-needed products that have not 
yet been developed, such as FDCs and pediatric ARVs, and 
on existing products with high prices that may decrease with 
economies of scale, such as many second-line ARVs.   
UNITAID has worked with the WHO HIV/AIDS 
Programme and the Department of Essential Medicines and 
Pharmaceutical Policies to draw up a list of missing essential 
ARVs [15]. The next steps will be to establish a licensing 
agency and to work with the relevant patent owners to agree 
on the specific licensing terms. Once up and running and 
proven effective, the patent pool could expand to respond to 
other diseases and health needs in developing countries. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
  Despite recent achievements in scaling up access to ARV 
treatment, the latest estimates indicate that AIDS treatment 
still reaches less than one-third of those in need [16]. 
Developing and delivering appropriate, affordable, well-
adapted medicines remains as urgent a challenge as ever. It 
requires new approaches to managing intellectual property in 
a manner that will support access to medicines for all. 
UNITAID extends an invitation to all concerned parties – 
patients, governments, donor agencies, civil society and 
generic and patent-owning pharmaceutical companies – to 
collaborate in establishing a patent pool that will broaden 
access to the knowledge that can save lives and improve 
health. 
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